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3 application is James (1989 James ( , 1992 through her studies of cancer nurses' emotional labor, which focused on management's exploitation of gendered 'compassion' in the 'caring workplace '. 3 In a study of childcare education and training, Colley (2006/this volume) notes that few researchers have specifically investigated the learning of feelings for caring occupations.
Indeed, there are relatively few specific studies of workplace learning of feeling rules and skills in commercial services. Those studies that exist have tended to focus as much on the informal process of workplace socialisation as on formal training. For example, Seymour and Sandiford's (2005) study of the learning of emotion rules in a chain of UK public houses offers an analysis which highlights how emotion rules are in turn learned, internalised, controlled and monitored. In addition, these studies reveal that employers' recruitment and selection processes often play a formative role in ensuring a steady supply of compatible employees for subsequent workplace learning schemes, such as customer orientation programmes (Rikowski, 2002; Brook and Pioch, 2006) . Hence, service organisations frequently prioritise the possession of an appropriate personality and attitude when recruiting front-line workers rather than 'hard', technical skills (Filby, 1992; Callaghan & Thompson, 2002; Wright, 2005; Townsend, 2006; Tyler, 2009 ). This is believed by employers to enhance the effectiveness of corporate socialisation and training of the requisite 'soft skills' (Grugulis, 2007) . Furthermore, the highly gendered, 'feminine' content of such 'soft skills' (Grugulis and Vincent, 2009; Payne, 2009; Scholarios and Taylor, 2010) means that women continue to dominate the vast bulk of UK service employment (Warhurst and Nickson, 2007) .
Moreover, much interactive service work in the commercial sector requires that workers not only possess a suitable personality but also a physical appearance that 'embodies' the corporate or brand image (Pettinger, 2005) . Indeed, this can also require a degree of sexualised display and behaviour (Filby, 1992; . What is common to all forms of emotional labor is the high degree to which it is both formally learnt and informally inculcated in the workplace, irrespective of whether the worker is a highly qualified 'professional' or a part-time sales assistant.
Despite a myriad of studies and theoretical developments since its publication, it is difficult to overestimate the enduring importance of Hochschild's (1983 Hochschild's ( /2003 ) pioneering theorisation of emotional labor, its reproduction, management and effects. This is especially so for those within the Marxist tradition, as she offers a damning analysis of the cost of 4 4 capitalism's wholesale exploitation of workers' emotional labor power. In addition, for those of us wanting to understand the function of workplace learning within the capitalist labor process, she reveals its pivotal and extensive role in enabling employers to harness the 'right attitude' amongst employees by inculcating, training, regulating and cajoling service 'feeling rules'. Equally importantly, Hochschild's account reveals managerial control is not complete, as workers' response to management's emotional prescription and labor intensification is frequently indifference and resistance, which often takes the form of a 'war of smiles' where meaningful emotional display is damaged, dimmed or withdrawn.
Despite the enormous strengths of Hochschild's thesis, her application of Marx's alienation theory is partial and overemphasises the deleterious individual experience at the expense of the ameliorative role of wider workplace. This is principally because she restricts her explicit theorisation of alienation to the two of Marx's (1975 Marx's ( [1844 ) four dimensions that are specific to the workplace: product alienation and labor process alienation. The first deals with workers' loss of control over and ownership of their labor product, and the second with the removal of their control over the labor process. However, while alienation has its source at the point of production, Marx's remaining two dimensions relate to the wider corrosive effects of alienation in society, and should not be separated from the first two (Yuill, 2005) .
These dimensions -human nature alienation and fellow beings alienation (including commodity fetishism) -deal with the way the suffusion of the commodity form and market relations through society severely distort our self-knowledge, social relations and understanding of the world. While these dimensions are occasionally implicit in Hochschild's analysis, she does not explore them as wider social dimensions of alienation contributing to and compounding the direct commodification of workplace emotions. In not doing so, she stops short of theorising alienation as generic to capitalist society (Meszaros, 2005 (Meszaros, [1970 ; Billig, 1999) . Furthermore, The Managed Heart is devoid of an explicit class analysis. This undermines Hochschild's argument in explaining individual and collective responses, including resistance by workers to their emotional subordination. She compounds this weakness with an insufficiently dialectical analysis (Rees, 1998) whereby she is unable to capture the contradictory and complex nature of the labor process (Sturdy, 1998; Taylor, 5 5 1998). Therefore, Hochschild inadequately theorises the way workers are shaped by alienation but for all that are not blinded to the reality of capitalism (Lukács, 1974) . Although Hochschild's application of Marx's alienation theory is partial 4 and overemphasises the deleterious individual experience at the expense of the ameliorative role of wider workplace relations, it offers a damning and convincing analysis of the cost of capitalism's wholesale exploitation and commodification of workers' emotional labor. Her study reveals how employers seek to recruit and harness the 'right attitude' by inculcating, training and regulating prescribed service 'feeling rules'. In addition, because of the tendency of emotional labor power to be more indeterminate than its physical and mental counterparts (Bolton, 2005; Brook, 2010) , learning to labor with feeling is an ongoing process, where management continually seek to reinforce and amend their 'feeling rules' to increase emotional effort and enhance 'emotional displays' in response to competitive market pressures. However, Hochschild's portrayal also reveals that managerial prescription, control and labor intensification generates workers' indifference and resistance, which takes the form of a 'war of smiles' where meaningful emotional display is damaged, dimmed or withdrawn.
This chapter explores the experience of learning and performing emotional labor through the lens of Hochschild's application of alienation theory to her study of flight attendants in The Managed Heart. In so doing, what follows is a critical defence of the analytic and political value of Hochschild's original formulation as the basis for a more thorough theorisation of the reproduction of emotional labor power within contemporary workplaces. Therefore, this chapter seeks to reassert and strengthen Hochschild's central argument that all front-line service workers, irrespective of whether they work in a commercial service industry, such as air travel, or a public sector service, such as education, experience profound alienation because of the loss of ownership and control of their emotional product. Therefore, employers 5 require workers to suppress and deny their 'true selves', which is compounded by their formal subordination to the 'customer' as well as their manager. Just such an analysis also sheds light on the scope and role of learning generally under capitalist conditions. This is because the example of employer led workplace learning, with its growing emphasis inculcating 'customer-oriented' values, lays bare the increasing need of capital to create widespread acceptance, even enthusiasm, within society for the daily reality of engaging in the alienating social relations which comprise contemporary 'consumer culture'.
Emotional labor in play
The Managed Heart's opening lines set the analytic and political tone for what is to come.
Hochschild begins by citing the case of the young boy in a wallpaper factory discussed by Marx in Capital. She notes Marx's point that the boy is no more than an instrument of labor, and expresses a fundamental concern at the human cost. Hochschild then makes a direct comparison between the boy in the nineteenth-century wallpaper factory and a flight attendant over a century later:
The work done by the boy in the wallpaper factory called for a co-ordination of mind and arm, mind and finger, and mind and shoulder. We refer to it simply as physical labor. The flight attendant does physical labor when she pushes heavy meal carts through the aisles, and she does mental work when she prepares for and actually organizes emergency landings and evacuations. But in the course of doing this physical and mental labor she is doing something more, something I define as 'emotional labor'. This labor requires one to induce or suppress feelings in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others.
( 1983/2003: 7) Here Hochschild is laying the foundations for her argument that the human cost of performing emotional labor is as harmful as that of the physical and mental labor discussed by Marx. This is because 'beneath the difference between physical and emotional labor there lies a similarity in the possible cost of doing the work: the worker can become estranged or alienated from an aspect of self -either the body or the margins of the soul -that is 'used' to do the work' (ibid.: 7).
The early introduction of alienation theory is joined by another equally fundamental use of Marx's critique of wage labor; namely, the distinction between exchange value and use value in the commodification of emotions. This is integral to Hochschild's primary definition of emotional labor as 'the management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display; emotional labor is sold for a wage and therefore has 'exchange value'. I use the synonymous terms 'emotion work' or 'emotion management' to refer to those same acts done in a private context where they have 'use value'' (ibid.).
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Hochschild's analysis rests on this distinction between emotion work and emotional labor. Emotion work is the process of managing and presenting emotions in the private sphere of our lives, such as amongst family and friends and even as a customer. Emotional labor, in contrast, involves the transmutation of a worker's 'private sphere' feelings into a package of commodified emotions that is consumed by the customer as a service interaction.
The process has the effect of alienating frontline workers from their emotional product Second, management imposes codified feeling rules on emotional laborers in order to ensure the delivery of the requisite quality of service. These rules dictate the form, content and appropriateness of emotional displays, thereby separating workers from the design and control of the labor process. Workers, therefore, are estranged from their emotional product and the process of emotion production.
Hochschild argues that employers' feeling rules increasingly go further than demanding behavioural compliance, which she calls surface acting. This is because management frequently strives for emotional workers to internalise the feelings they are required to display, not only in order to enhance the 'quality' of the emotional display, but also to diminish the likelihood of emotive dissonance (Jansz and Timmers, 2002) Deep acting is the result of a worker seeking a more comfortable space for herself, free from the dangers of emotive dissonance (Jansz and Timmers, 2002) through what
Hochschild refers to as a process of fusion between her real and acted emotional labor.
However, despite fusion's apparent benefits, there is 'a cost to be paid ' (1983/2003: 119 . Such a theory, she argues, has to possess both social and psychological dimensions in that it needs to be able to ask how the construction of social interaction for profit influences an individual's personality. Hence, while employers' 'feeling rules run deep … so does the self that struggles with and against them' (ibid.: 229).
Hochschild states that to manage feeling is to strive consciously to alter a pre-existing emotional state that is indicative of a given self. Yet this notion of a psychological given self does little to articulate its relationship with the socially constructed dimension of emotion. The idea of prior expectation implies the existence of a prior self that does the expecting … Most of us maintain a prior expectation of a continuous self, but the character of the self we expect to maintain is subject to profoundly social influence.
Insofar as the self and all we expect is social … the way emotion signals messages to us is also influenced by social factors. (ibi.: 231-2)
Hochschild's theory of emotion, therefore, binds together the psychological and the social into an interdependent and dynamic unity that is akin to Marx's ontology of the dialectical unity of the mind and body (Marx, 1975 (Marx, [1844 ; Meszaros, 2005 Meszaros, [1970 ). It does this by integrating the notions of emotion as a signal function -a biological sensory function -with socially constructed prior expectations as indicative of the given self. Without such a conceptualisation, it would be incoherent to theorise alienated emotional labor, for without a 9 9 theory of human nature, how is it possible to identify an alien condition that violates the individual?
Hochschild's given self, like Marx's theory of 'human nature', appears to oppose the common-sense idea that each individual possesses a common, discrete and fixed human nature independent of society (Ollman, 1976 (Ollman, [1971 ). While Hochschild does not provide an explicit anthropology of the given self, her implied conceptualisation is not incompatible with
Marx's materialist conception, which argues that the only nature-imposed condition of all human existence is the requirement to labor on the environment in order to satisfy human needs. As sentient beings, humans are different from other animals -we are reflective and imaginative in the abstract before concretely acting on our natural environment (Marx, 1976 [1867]). Marx calls our capacity for conscious labor species being. This is not just a theory of individual human nature: species being is inherently social because in order to survive, individuals have to enter into collaborative, interdependent relationships.
For Marx, the source of alienation in capitalist society is the necessity for the overwhelming majority of people to labor for a wage in order to ensure physical survival and a semblance of emotional dignity, where a minority, the ruling class, owns and controls the means of production. A worker, therefore, hands over ownership and effective control of her labor -in other words, her species being. For Marx, this essential relationship between worker and capital generates alienation in capitalist society:
The fact that labour is external to the worker, i.e. it does not belong to his essential being; that he therefore does not confirm himself in his work, but denies himself, feels miserable and not happy, does not develop free physical and mental energy but mortifies his flesh and ruins his mind. Hence, the worker only feels himself when he is not working. (Marx, 1975: 326) Here, Marx explicitly refers to the ruination of body and mind. This understanding of mind and body as an interrelated dialectical unity (Yuill, 2005 ) is crucial to the task of interpreting the efficacy of Hochschild's argument that the experience of emotional labor is alienating in the same way as the production of physical commodities.
The human cost of emotional labor
Marx (1975), as indicated above, identified four dimensions of alienation, with the first twoproduct alienation and labor process alienation -dealing with the immediate conditions of workplace relations. The second two, fellow beings alienation and human nature alienation, encompass capitalist society as a whole. These dimensions are not separate processes with 10 10 discrete sets of symptoms, but are rather aspects of a generic process that is endemic to capitalism. This is because the whole of humankind is alienated, in that it suffers a loss of control because the power of capital is embodied as an alien force that confronts individuals and society as a hostile and potentially destructive power (Meszaros, 2005 (Meszaros, [1970 
Product alienation
The worker is alienated from the product of her labor by the simple fact that it is not she who owns or controls its disposal, but rather the capitalist. The consequence is that the product of her labor is objectified and appears as external to herself rather than as an affirmation of herself, her species being. Thus while the worker invests her energies and life in the production of the commodity, it is a one-way relationship -a 'one-sided enrichment of the object' (Ollman, 1976: 144 ) -for which she receives only money. The creative power, energy, thought and consideration that is required in order to make something 'vanishes into the object of alienated production, which in turn is not replaced by other revitalising creative power' (Yuill, 2005: 135) . Hochschild concurs with the idea of a 'one-sided enrichment' when she states that when the product 'is a smile, a mood, a feeling, or a relationship, it comes to belong more to the organization and less to the self ' (1983/2003: 198) . This is because for the cabin crew in Hochschild's study, their smiles 'were seen as an extension of the make-up, the uniform, the recorded music, the soothing pastel colours of the airplane decor, and the daytime drinks, which taken together orchestrate the mood of the passengers' (ibid.: 8). Hochschild, like Marx, sees this estrangement from the product of labor as having a human cost for emotional laborers. While Marx makes the general point that alienated labor 'mortifies the flesh and ruins the mind', Hochschild is more specific and identifies emotive dissonance amongst many cabin crew where they experience 'burnout' and 'emotional deadness' and feel 'phoney' (see Jansz and Timmers, 2002) .
Emotive dissonance is the result of a worker investing emotionally in her performance over a prolonged period. The cumulative effect is that she suffers an emotional 'malnourishment' caused by an insufficient revitalising return on her investment. Hochschild argues that there comes a breaking point between the real and acted self, and that as a matter of self-protection she is forced to 'divide': 'some workers conclude that only one self (usually 11 11 the non-work self) is the real self. Others, and they are the majority, will decide that each self is meaningful and real in its own different way and time ' (1983/2003: 132 ).
Hochschild appears to argue that emotional labor elicits a more profound form of alienation than even Marx imagined. This is because the majority of workers can only cope with their estrangement by 'fusing' their commercialised selves with their real, 'private sphere' selves. Hochschild's argument, therefore, implies that Marx underestimated the potency of alienation when he stated that 'the worker only feels himself when he is not working ' (1975: 326) .
Labor process alienation
Closely allied to product alienation is labor process alienation, wherein workers lack control over the process of production -that is, the conditions under which we work, how our work
is organised, what we produce and the effect it has on our health (Cox, 1998) . For Marx, by wresting control of the labor process, capital denudes us of our intrinsic capacity to work creatively and transforms it into its opposite. Thus a worker experiences 'power as impotence … [and his] own physical and mental energy, his personal life … as an activity directed against himself, which is independent of him and does not belong to him ' (1975: 327) .
Another dimension to labor process alienation is the fact that work is under the control of forces hostile to us. This is because owing to the competitive nature of capitalism, managers are under constant pressure to extract more value from the worker, thereby cheapening the worth of the individual to capitalism. As capitalism develops and corporations grow larger, there is a general tendency for work to be designed to achieve ever greater economies of scale, unit efficiencies and labor productivity, thereby enhancing the importance of the productive process, its logistics and technologies over the skills and value of the individual. The result is that 'the special skill of each individual, insignificant factory operative vanishes as an infinitesimal quantity before the science, the gigantic physical forces, and mass of labour that are embodied in the factory mechanism' (Marx, 1976: 548) , and the 'idiosyncrasies of the worker appear increasingly as mere sources of error' (Lukács, 1974: 89) .
Hochschild echoes Marx and Lukács when she argues that contemporary service jobs 'are now socially engineered and thoroughly organised from the top ' (1983/2003: 8) . Yet management's control of workers' display and performance is contradictory and unstable.
She details how, during cabin-crew training, airlines seek to suppress workers' negative emotions, which are largely born of their experience of the service labor process where they 12 12 are 'treated with disrespect or anger by a client, [yet] all the while closeting into fantasy the anger one would like to respond with' (ibid: 85-6). For her, companies' efforts to control the service labor process is an estranging experience in which 'the more seriously social engineering affects our behaviour and our feelings, the more intensely we must address a new ambiguity about who is directing them (is this me or the company talking?)' (ibid.: 34).
Moreover, Hochschild is at pains to highlight the alienation that derives from the progressive devaluing of a worker's creative contribution through the increasing rationalisation of the labor process. Hochschild shows how the worker is no more than an appendage to the externally imposed smile factory system, and her personal, defensive responses are treated by employers as 'mere sources of error', such as offering 'a thin crust of display' (ibid.: 21) in order to cope with management's ever increasing service targets.
For Hochschild, new forms of deskilling compound the alienation generated by the corporate control of the labor process, and the ever greater competitive pressures to rationalise the service production system. Following Braverman (1974) , she argues that there is a tendency for the 'mind' of the work process to 'move up the hierarchy leaving jobs deskilled and workers devalued ' (1983/2003: 119) . For example, cabin crew training on how to deal with angry passengers is a form of deskilling. This is because the 'mind of the emotion worker, the source of the ideas about what mental moves are needed to settle down an 'irate' has moved upstairs in the hierarchy so that the worker is restricted to implementing standard procedures' (ibid.: 120).
In summary, Hochschild's theory of emotional labor explicitly argues that workers are systematically alienated from their service product and the labor process that determines the form and timing of its manufacture. However, while her explicit theorisation peters out beyond the immediacy of workplace relations, she does provide a partial analysis of the impact of emotional labor on wider capitalist social relations. As a result, it is possible to argue that her thesis, rather than rejecting the remaining two dimensions of Marx's theory of alienation, instead possesses the potential for their acceptance and integration.
Human nature alienation
Human nature alienation is that aspect of alienation, which addresses the damaging and distorting effects of capitalist society on our species being. For while capitalism has immeasurably enhanced our collective capacity to transform the world through medicine, travel, communication, modern agriculture, etc. in the interests of all, this capacity is thwarted. This is because capitalism suppresses our potential to realise our collective species 13 13 being, based as it is on an anarchic drive for profits, competition, class division and exploitation. Hochschild appears to hint at an understanding of the way capitalism's capacity to meet the needs and desires of humanity is thwarted by its need to put profit before all else.
At most, her position on this feature of alienation is ambiguous:
Massive people-processing -and the advanced engineering of emotional labor that makes it possible -is a remarkable achievement. It is also an important one, for a good part of modern life involves exchange between total strangers, who in the absence of countermeasures and in the pursuit of short-term interest, might much of the time act out suspicion and anger rather than trust and good will … But like most great achievements, the advanced engineering of emotional labor leaves new dilemmas in its wake, new human costs. (ibid.: 187)
Hochschild, however, is openly contradictory as to whether the alienating costs of emotional labor can be removed by simply reorganising its production process or instead requires the systemic replacement of capitalist social relations. At several points, she seems to suggest that workers can avert alienation by successfully managing their 'true self': 'When feelings are successfully commercialized, the worker does not feel phoney or alien; she feels somehow satisfied in how personal her service actually was. Deep acting is a help in doing this, not a source of estrangement' (ibid: 136).
This is a shift away from Marx's theorisation of alienation as a systemic dimension of capitalist relations of production, and towards one that posits it as primarily an individualised, pathological condition that can be 'treated' within capitalist social relations. Indeed, subsequent writers have drawn on this inconsistency to argue that it is possible to remove the alienating psychological costs of emotional labor by redesigning the work to ensure greater autonomy and control for the individual (Wharton, 1996; Ashworth and Humphrey, 1993) . In short, Hochschild's ambiguous theorisation and her inconsistencies on the nature of alienation and its existence beyond the immediate realm of workplace relations serve to blunt her overall critique of the generic commodification of human feelings.
Conversely, Hochschild also suggests that capitalism's deepening and spreading market relations have a cumulative spill-over effect into wider society. In her 2003 afterword to The Managed Heart, she refers to the increasing take-up of 'personal services' and the way private life is progressively invaded and shaped by commodified emotional labor, suggesting a 'vital link between larger social contradictions and private efforts to manage feeling' (ibid.: 202). These contradictions, she states, which generate emotional strain between the real and false selves, now exist not only at work but also at home, and increasingly 'in between' work 14 14 and home. Thus, she tentatively hints at the possibility of an analysis that would highlight emotional labor's alienating, corrosive effects beyond the workplace.
Fellow beings alienation and commodity fetishism
Fellow beings alienation refers to social relations between individuals that increasingly take the form of relationships between commodities. In a society based on the production and consumption of commodities, the pervasiveness of commodities can seem an inevitable, even a natural state of affairs (Lukács, 1974; May, 2006) . Marx states that under capitalism, the wealth of society appears as an 'immense collection of commodities', with the commodity becoming a 'universal category of society as a whole' (Marx, 1976: 125) .
For Marx, this generates a multi-dimensional phenomenon throughout capitalist society, which he calls 'commodity fetishism ' (1976) . Consequently, we experience relationships with each other not as individuals, but as if we were extensions of capitalism (Ollman, 1976) . As capitalism develops, commodification encroaches and invades our lives to the point at which a life outside market relations and independent of commodities is unimaginable. This is because marketers and advertisers ensure we are confronted perpetually by their messages and images that connect the consuming of things and experiences (from washing machines to dating agencies to air travel) with gaining success, respect, beauty and happiness. The result is that our daily lives, aspirations and self-concepts are indelibly inscribed by our unavoidable relationship with commodities. Consequently, even as consumers, we are alienated because of our enmeshed dependence on the market, where 'the very character of man is at the mercy of his products, of what they make him want and become in order to get what he wants' (Ollman, 1976: 146) .
Individuals also relate to each other in society as objectified bearers of the commodities that they produce, possess and consume. The consequence is that commodities acquire social and human characteristics, as with 'cool', 'sophisticated' and 'sexy' brands, owing to our entering into unequal social relationships based on the amount (especially the amount of money) and quality of commodities we possess (Lodziak, 2002) . Our social interactions are also determined by our place and function in the market as managers or managed; service workers or customers; 'professionals' or clients; employed or unemployed;
and so on. Indeed, this market structured inequality and competiveness also suffuses noncommercial service interactions, such as between teacher and student (Harvie, 2006) , and medic and patient (Yuill, 2005) . Thus, we encounter each other in competitive market relationships in which we are either in an inferior or a superior position (Cox, 1998) . In other 15 15 words, we are reified individuals and enter into reified relationships as the bearers of economic relations. As such, we are the personification of the commodities we possess (Lukács, 1974) .
Reification necessarily generates an obscuring of the actual social relations that lie behind the production of any commodity. We connect with our fellow humans through the lens of commodities, where all knowledge of and understanding of how and why our fellow humans produced the thing is submerged beneath a fetishised embrace of a commodity's assumed and claimed properties (Ollman, 1976) . One example of a fetishised embrace is that of customer service. As customers, we expect sales staff to be trained to respect and value us irrespective of whether that respect and value is sincere. Thus commodity fetishism 9 is the process whereby human relationships are reified as exchange values, human qualities are invested in material commodities, and real social relations of production are obscured to the point at which the world of markets and commodities appears to be almost independent of human design.
Hochschild does not acknowledge fellow beings alienation and commodity fetishism as being a dimension to Marx's theory, nor to her own. However, as in the case of human nature alienation, her theorisation does not close off its existence. Indeed, The Managed
Heart is replete with references to and examples of commodity fetishism. She shows how cabin crews' existence as commodified labor power generates a fetishised discourse on their worth as things. Managers continually remind them of their disposability due to competition for cabin crew jobs. Even more starkly, managers refer to them as 'bodies for the flight' and 'breakage' when they are too ill to work (ibid.: 136). Hochschild recognises this as reification when she explains that 'surface and deep acting in a commercial setting … make one's face and feelings take on the properties of a resource … to be used to make money' (ibid.: 55).
She further explains that a broader managerial discourse, based on a corporate logic in the airline industry, underpins this. This discourse makes 'a series of links between competition, market expansion, advertising, heightened passenger expectations about rights to display, and company demands for acting' (ibid.: 90), thereby generating an ideological justification and pressure for the codification and learning of ever-more feeling rules. Thus, Hochschild recognises that management continually seek to inculcate amongst workers a reified, 'taken for granted' perspective on the naturalness of their being treated as things. Moreover, she recognises that this managerial process is heightened in conditions of increasing completion and/or expenditure reduction when employers seek labor intensification. The significance of Hochschild's ambiguity is that she leaves open the theoretical door to the argument that away from the immediacy of workplace relations, capitalist society possesses spaces free from alienation, whereas Marx's commodity fetishism theory makes plain that in a society based on commodity production, there is no escape from alienation. As Mészáros explains, 'selling is the practice of alienation [as] alienation is characterized by the universal extension of 'saleability' [and] by the conversion of human beings into 'things' so that they could appear as commodities on the market ' (2005 [1970] : 35).
Commodity fetishism, class-consciousness and resistance
Commodity fetishism is central to Marx's theory of class-consciousness and class struggle. This is because commodity fetishism produces the appearance 'that class exploitation is not a social product but the inevitable and unalterable result of the functioning of the market' (Rees, 1998: 95) . Class distinctions are also submerged by the common experience of being a customer. This is particularly acute in contemporary 'consumer capitalism' thanks to the ideological elevation in status of consumers over producers through the 'myth of consumerism' (Lodziak, 2002) , wherein workers and billionaires appear to possess, in equal measure, 'customer sovereignty'. Commodity fetishism, therefore, is the harbinger of a distorted ideology peculiar to capitalism in which 'all men and their circumstance appear upside-down as in a camera obscura' Engels, 1970 [1845] : 47). As such, under capitalism 'widespread social beliefs become so distorted that they are insufficient for understanding the social conditions which have produced such beliefs' (Billig, 1999: 314) .
Commodity fetishism may dominate the everyday consciousness of workers, but it is not an 'iron cage' of ideological distortion. This is because the wage-labor relationship 17 17 comprises a central contradiction that acts as a countertendency to commodity fetishism.
Thus, although capitalists treat workers' labor power as if it were another purchased tool to be exploited intensely, it is unlike any other commodity, for it is not possible to separate the worker from the labor power itself (Rikowski, 2002; Thompson and Smith, 2010) . When an item is bought from a shop, full ownership and control of the commodity passes to the consumer. However, the price, content and duration of labor power are subject to continual haggling. Moreover, the 'worker brazenly accompanies his labor power right into the workplace and stands protectively by it while arguing 'about the terms of its sale' (Rees, 1998: 221) . For Lukács (1974) , this central contradiction corrodes and prises open the grip of commodity fetishism. This is because while the reified 'laws' of labor market relations may accept as normal, even understandable, the daily struggle (antinomy) over the terms on which labor power is sold, capitalism is unable to resolve this most profound of all structural contradictions. Accordingly, this contradictory experience continually presents workers with the potential power and opportunity to question capital's ideological hegemony and exploitative social relations, and their own reification as commodities (Rees, 1998) .
Workers, therefore, are compelled to address the social reality of their commodification and its exchange as a struggle for justice and dignity against exploitation and abuse by employers. Through this experience, nascent working-class consciousness emerges and begins to oppose the distortions of commodity fetishism, with the potential for workers to collectively 'use this insight to unravel all the other mystifications of human relations that have taken on the appearance of relations between things' (Rees, 1998: 222) .
Thus, a contradictory consciousness exists within classes and individuals, comprising a dialectical relationship between commodity fetishism as bourgeois ideology, and class consciousness. Alienation, therefore, is never a complete process but is instead a contradictory one that generates the potential for conscious resistance by workers to commodity fetishism and its underpinning, dehumanising social relations.
The Managed Heart offers argument and evidence that supports this analysis of the relationship between commodity fetishism and class-consciousness, without itself utilising either concept. Hochschild's 'transmutation of feelings' is an unstable state, vulnerable to the contradictions of capitalist accumulation processes, as she explains: 'When an industry speed-up drastically shortens the time available between flight attendants and passengers, it can become virtually impossible to deliver emotional labor. In that event, the transmutation of emotion work, feeling rules, and social exchange will fail ' (1983/2003: 121) . The instability of transmutation arises, for the most part, from the central contradiction intrinsic to 18 18 the wage-labor relationship: the daily struggle over the terms of sale of workers' emotional labor, particularly in an increasingly competitive environment:
The companies worry that competitors may produce more personal service than they do, so they continue to press for 'genuinely friendly' service. But they feel compelled to keep the conveyor belt moving faster and faster. For workers, the job of 'enjoying the job' becomes harder and harder. Rewards seem less intrinsic to the work, more compensation for the arduousness of it. (ibid.: 125)
Hochschild explains that when management is seeking to intensify emotional laborers' work, there is a corresponding reaction by many workers that undermines any such efforts, and protects the workers' perceived value of their labor power:
The company exhorts them to smile more, and 'more sincerely', at an increasing number of passengers. The workers respond to the speed-up with a slowdown: they smile less broadly, with a quick release and no sparkle in the eyes, thus dimming the company's message to the people. It is a war of smiles. (ibid.: 127)
Hochschild's 'war of smiles' can be seen as a breach in the wall of commodity fetishism that allows class consciousness to emerge. As management imposes ever more feeling rules and demands greater effort, trade unionism gives expression to workers' 'accumulated resentment and discontent ' (ibid.: 126) . This burgeoning class-consciousness is also evident in reactions to those workers who respond positively to management's work intensification: they 'become the 'rate-busters' who are resented by other workers ' (ibid.: 130) . Thus Hochschild acknowledges that the commodification of emotional labor is a contradictory process that tends to generate resistance to management's control of the labor process:
As one veteran put it: 'The more the company sees the battle, the tougher they get with the regulations. They define them more precisely. They come up with more categories and more definitions. And more emotionalizing. And then, in time, we reject them even more'. (ibid.: 130).
Hochschild's analysis, therefore, interprets resistance to exploitation and subordination -and its accompanying undermining of commodity fetishism -as being generated by the contradictory nature of wage (emotional) labor.
'Crippled actors' or resistive agents?
Hochschild's account of resistance demonstrates that she understands that workers are reflexive and possess the agency to begin to challenge their alienation. This contradicts a commonly made criticism of her thesis, namely that she presents emotional laborers as 'crippled actors' in that their 'transmutation of feelings' implies they cannot exert an active and controlling force in relationships with management and customers (Bolton and Boyd, 2003; Bolton, 2005) . This is because Hochschild is said to imbue management's feeling rules with such dominance that the performance of service interactions becomes an atomised experience for the worker, where emotional reassessment is anaesthetised by alienation. This is evidently not the case, for Hochschild clearly theorises workers' transmutation of feelings as being inherently unstable owing to the daily playing-out of the struggle at the frontier of control of emotional labor power. Equally, she is able to explain how the breakdown of 'transmutation of feelings' frequently transforms itself into conscious, organised resistance.
Nevertheless, such is the frequency of the 'crippled actors' charge and its milder form of being too 'one-dimensional' (Callaghan and Thompson, 2002: 248) , that her account of resistance requires more detailed critical assessment.
Since The Managed Heart, competition, restructuring and work intensification have fuelled unionisation and militancy in the airline industry globally (Blyton et al, 2001) , and the resistive 'emotional labor' of cabin crew has proved a rich source of empirical study (for example Linstead, 1995; Tyler and Taylor, 2001; Bolton and Boyd, 2003) . Indeed, Linstead's (1995) account of the 1993 strike by Cathay Pacific cabin crew against staff cuts and the consequent speeding-up of work appears to take up the 'story' where Hochschild leaves off.
In it, he captures the contradictory struggle between management's normative (and gendered) feeling rules, and the class-conscious nature of resistance to them: 'In the advertisements, the Cathay girls fix [a] sultry smile then avert their faces with Asian humility … this servile image has been smashed by the perfumed picket line which has shown itself to be tough, resilient and well orchestrated' (Linstead, 1995: 200) .
While the airline industry represents the best example of militant trade unionism by emotional laborers, there is also evidence that in their day-to-day activities, cabin-crew 'remain very aware … that they are offering an empty performance … without ever buying-in to the norms set by the company' (Bolton and Boyd, 2003: 301) . Moreover, there exists a plethora of evidence from other service industries of day-to-day, informal individual and collective resistance, irrespective of a union presence (for example Ogbonna and Harris, 2004; Sandiford, 2007) . Thus in call centres, Mulholland found that 'sales sabotage, working 20 20 to rule, work avoidance, absenteeism and high turnover are expressions of a workplace antagonism rooted in and against the social relations of production ' (2004: 720) . Moreover, workers invariably direct their resistance against customers as well as against managers. In betting shops, Filby (1992) found that while women are employed for their 'figures', their 'personality' and their 'bums', they exploited their sexualised emotional labor to assert informal control by developing a culture of sexual humour to ridicule and humiliate male managers and unpleasant 'punters'. Likewise, Taylor and Bain's (2003b) call-centre research found that workplace activists used a culture of humour to subvert anti-union managerial authority in their campaign for trade union recognition. Thus, Taylor (1998: 99) is correct to argue that workers experience an 'incomplete transmutation', and that as a resource for the creation of surplus value, the emotional labor of service employees is a 'double-edged sword' (Filby, 1992) . While in the public sector there is widespread opposition by service workers to the creeping 'marketisation' (and privatisation) of education, health and other services, where commercial values of competition and profit undermine employment conditions and the principles of egalitarian public service provision (Ogbonna and Harris, 2004; Harvie, 2006; and Taylor and Cooper, 2008) .
Studies on resistance amongst emotional laborers, in a range of service settings, tend to highlight the triadic nature of the labor process in which the core relationship for analysis is expanded to include the service recipient (in varying degrees) alongside the employer and employee (Korczynski, 2002; Sandiford, 2007) . Likewise, many point to the existence of shifting boundaries at the 'frontier of control' (for example Tyler and Taylor, 2001; Taylor and Bain, 2003a) , where 'management control of emotional labor can be partial, incoherent and often contradictory' (Taylor, 1998: 100) . This is due to the 'exacerbated' labor indeterminacy of emotional production (Bolton, 2005: 62) , as management struggles to control the thoughts, feelings and behaviours of workers during service interactions. This in turn is further exacerbated where there is a greater degree of 'professional' autonomy such as in classrooms (Harvie, 2006) , in hospital wards (Theodosius, 2008) and where there is little or no formal supervision, as with the example of nannies (Isserles, 2010) . Consequently, service regimes are marked by a process of informal, 'continual negotiation and renegotiation [with management and service recipients] over the transformation of emotional labor power into a serviceable product' (Callaghan and Thompson, 2002: 251) . This relies, in turn, on an informal process of workplace socialisation, outside of direct management control, through which workers share and inculcate knowledge of the 'renegotiated' feeling rules (Korczynski, 2002; Seymour and Sandiford, 2005 (Callaghan and Thompson, 2002) .
While Hochschild does not, in her theory, close off the potential for the type of daily getting by and getting back activities outlined above, she largely omits an explicit analysis of them. Moreover, her lack of a theorisation of class means that she does not possess the conceptual armoury to account for them as preconditions and precursors to more classconscious acts of resistance, in contrast to more recent, Marxist oriented labor process analysis (LPA) studies of emotional laborers (for example Taylor, 1998; Taylor and Bain, 2003a, 2003b; Mulholland, 2004) . These studies have sought to overcome this weakness by arguing for the integration of the emotional labor concept with LPA's theorisation of relations of production as antagonistic and contradictory, thereby producing 'a complex interplay of compliance, consent and resistance' (Taylor, 1998: 100) . Nevertheless, to date there has not been a detailed and systematic assessment of Hochschild's theoretical adequacy from within the LPA tradition.
Finally, it should be noted that Hochschild explores the experience of emotional labor principally through the individualised, conceptual lens of her distinction between individuals' surface and deep acting, and 'transmutation of feelings' (Bolton, 2005) . By focusing on the immediacy of the individualised commodification process, in contrast with the LPA approach, she insufficiently locates her analysis in the wider context of workplace class relations. Thus, she underemphasises the basis, form and significance of collectively forged organisational space for worker agency and activity outside and within the commodification
process. Yet a lack of emphasis is not the same thing as a theoretical closure, as Bolton and Boyd (2003) and Bolton (2005) have argued. Rather, Hochschild's portrayal of the emotional labor workplace is one in which consent, indifference and conscious resistance by workers 22 22 are ever present, but are unduly overshadowed by her conceptual foregrounding of the deleterious impact on individuals from the commodification of their emotions.
Conclusion: Reasserting the human cost of emotional labor
The Managed Heart may suffer from theoretical ambiguities, inconsistencies and gaps but its core arguments remain tenable within the context of a classical Marxist analysis (Rees, 1998 ). Hochschild convincingly argues that learning and performing emotional labor requires the formal commodification of a worker's emotions. Commonly, this process commences with employers recruiting and selecting employees with the right attitude and personality as prerequisites for delivering the form and style of service demanded by management.
However, in order to realise this potential and sustain it, an ongoing process of workplace learning is frequently employed to inculcate workers with the desired customer-oriented values and behaviours, which Hochschild refers to as 'feeling rules'. The result is that their emotion work is then subjected to management design and control, which in turn is subject to labor intensification as employers continually search for enhanced performance. Equally importantly, she reveals the contradictory and antagonistic nature of the experience.
Consequently, she is also able to begin to account for why and how workers learn to ameliorate and resist the loss of control and ownership of their emotional labor.
For Hochschild, emotional labor is an acutely alienating variant of wage labor that systemically throws workers into a daily struggle to secure a dignified sense of self. It also increasingly involves management deploying workplace learning strategies in an attempt to secure adequate soft skill levels, behavioural compliance and corporate acculturation.
Hochschild's account of reproducing emotional labor in the workplace begins to reveal in stark fashion how all learning in contemporary capitalist society invariably possesses a is ' (198/2003: 12 ). Yet Hochschild does not attempt to theorise what might constitute an exploitation of emotional labor.
